The Architecture of World Governance
The UN Reform and the Alterglobalization Movement
Setting up an Arbitration Tribunal on Debt: An Alternative Solution?
Dialogs on Party Systems and Global Democratization
Rethinking Global Governance
For a Legitimate, Efficient, and Democratic Global Governance
Redefining Global Governance to Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century
The Future of Global Governance
The UN and World Governance
The UN: Which Reforms for What Future?
From Westernization to Globalization. A Brief History of Chinese Modernity
Moving Toward a New World Governance
Inventing a New World Governance Now
Alterglobalization, a Long-term Process Leading to Alternatives
The IMF, the World Bank, and Respect of Human Rights
Non-state Actors and World Governance
Governance for Sustainability
Imagine All the People: Advancing a Global Citizens Movement
Persistent corruption in low-income countries requires global action
What Amazonia Does the World Need?
Expanding and Reinforcing the Objectives of the Kyoto Protocol: Inciting International Stakeholders to Engage in Greenhouse-gas Transparency
Civil Society and the Legitimation of Global Governance
Giving Africa Voice within Global Governance: Oral History, Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Council
The Post-modern State
Global governance organizations (GGOs) create rules and regulations in a diverse array of policy domains from accounting to health to communications. This paper is part of a broader project considering the design and administration of such organizations. Specifically, the focus is on the structure of GGOs with attention to the scheme for representation of organization members and the bureaucracy charged with carrying out the organization’s activities. The relationship between key aspects of GGO structure and a set of independent variables (including the sector, funding, “technicality” and rule type) is explored.
Global governance organizations are at once captive to and free from a wildly diverse set of expectations. They are captive to sets of beliefs regarding the proper design of governmental systems with normative understanding of proper schemes of representation and bureaucratic process. Failure to comply with such norms will almost certainly bring scolds of disapproval (or worse).
And yet, in a perverse way, this may be liberating because it is clear that any global governance organization facing the world’s expectations will almost certainly disappoint the vast majority of people. This paper explores the structural choices made by global governance organizations (GGOs) in two senses. First, the political-representational structure is considered. Second, the bureaucratic- administrative structure is examined.
Many global governance organizations resemble self-contained narrow-purpose governments; they include a legislative (representational) and executive (bureaucratic) function within the overall organization. In considering the design of GGOs, therefore, it makes sense to consider both the “political” and “bureaucratic” elements of the organization. In other entities, these functions are not clearly distinguished; participants are represented within the apparatus of the organization itself and it is harder to make a sharp distinction between the bureaucracy and representative elements of the entity.